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SCHOOL DISTRICT RESPONSIBILITY FOR
NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION OF PUPILS
Rny~oiNs C. SEiTz*

Q CHOOL

playgrounds, gymnasiums, rest-rooms, halls, classrooms,
and manual training quarters are potential places of injury to
children. School trips, recess periods, and errands also present times
when children can be injured. The statistical fact that significant harm
happens seldom is no reason for denying the truth of the opening
statements. It is common knowledge that whenever children are gathered together there is always the threat of a disturbance which will
produce injury to some boy or girl. Even when a child is alone and
unsupervised he may injure himself. Certainly, there are enough actual
times when these things have happened to remove the assumptions
from the theoretical.
In the light, therefore, of such background this article has its justification. It has as its purpose a discussion of school district responsibility for the negligent supervision of pupils entrusted to its care. This
discussion, however, will not concern itself entirely with the law as it
exists. The broader objective of what the law should be will be undertaken, and in fact will be the fundamental goal. The present state of
*Professor of Law, Creighton University.

THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

the law will be set forth, but only to furnish a springboard to aid in
attaining the larger purpose.
With such ultimate end in view it is appropriate to start by noting
the law which decides the question in the absence of statute. From the
antiquated maxim, "The King can do no wrong" comes the commonlaw doctrine of immunity in tort of the state and its governmental
agencies.' And, even though there has been some breakdown of the
rule2 when agents of municipalities are performing corporate or proprietary powers rather than acts of a political or governmental nature,
there has never been any doubt about the non-liability of so-called
quasi-municipal corporations such as school districts.3 In connection
with school districts that are incapable of exercising the "corporate"
powers of municipalities, the distinction developed with respect to
"corporate" and "governmental" functions of municipal bodies is inapplicable. Certainly, therefore, under common law the district is
immune as regards tort liability for an injury which grows out of the
negligent act of a teacher in connection with the supervision of children.4 Such freedom from liability has its roots in the dogma about the
King just previously quoted. In cases arising under the common law,
court after court repeats that a school district is a governmental agency
of the state possessing only delegated powers, and as such is not liable
for torts of its agents unless such liability has been assumed or imposed by statute.6
Unless expediency be the justification for such a condition of the
law, there is no other sane explanation. The fallacy inherent in the
dogma that the King or the state can do no wrong-if indeed anyone
(1933) § 295; Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE
L. J. 1, 129 (1925) ; 34 YALE L. J. 229 (1926) ; 36 YALE L. J. 1 (1927) ; 36 YALE
L. J. 757, 1039; see also Notes, 39 YALE L. J. 550 (1930) ; 43 YALE L. J. 674
(1934).
2 On this point see HARPER, note 1, supra.
3 HARPER, ToRTs (1933) § 296.
4 See note, 17 ORE L. REv. 251 (1938) and cases cited therein; Kolar v. Union
Free School Dist. No. 9, Town of Lenox, 8 N.Y.S. (2d) 986 (1939); Hines
et al v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 170 Misc. 745, 10 N.Y.S. (2d) 840
(1939) ; Lindstrom et al v. City of Chicago, 331 I1. 144, 162 N.E. 128 (1928) ;
Mokovich v. Independent School District of Virginia, No. 22, 177 Minn. 446,
225 N.W. 292 (1929); McDonell v. Brozo et al, 285 Mich. 38, 280 N.W. 100
(1938); Perkins v. Trask, 95 Mont. 1, 23 P. (2d) 982 (1933); Lawyer v.
Joint Dist. No. 1, Mount Horeb and Blue Mounds, 232 Wis. 608, 288 N.W.
192 (1939), which even goes so far as holding that the statute requiring a
school board to keep school buildings and grounds in good repair and safe
condition, does not render the school district liable for the negligent failure to
perform such duty nor abrogate the rule of a municipality's non-liability for
negligence in performing governmental functions. Contra: Wodetzky et at v.
Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y. et al, 173 Misc. 136, 16 N.Y.S. (2d) 107 (1939)
and cases cited therein.
5 Barnett, Foundations of the Distinction Between Public and Private Functions
in Respect to Common-Law Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations, 16 ORE.
1

HARPER, ToRTs

L. REv. 250 (1937).
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ever did look upon the maxim as anything other than a rule of expediency-has been effectively exposed by so many authorities that it is
not necessary to quote them. Indeed, if we did not have so many such
utterances on the specific matter, the situation would be the same.
For Dean Green7 has irrefutably clarified the danger to reason in
courts continuing to heed generalizations when they are allowed to
parade under the sacrosanct banner of principles. His argument is a
clarion call to avoid the restricting influences of stereotyped legal
phrases.
That society through its elected representatives has deemed it wise
to limit the effect of the maxim which produces governmental immunity is common knowledge. Much statutory law coming out of various jurisdictions has specifically provided for various kinds of tort
actions to be brought against bodies performing governmental functions. This trend has manifested enough strength to cause pressure to
be brought in Congress which looks toward a much greater extension
of the tort liability of the United States.8
Therefore, a basic need in this discussion is to determine whether
expediency dictates a preservation of the common-law rule of school
district non-liability for the negligent supervision of children, or
whether social policy should produce a statutory change. The people
in a very few areas have already answered this question. Illustrative
of such attitude are the provisions of the California,9 Nevada, 0 and
Idaho" statutes which provide that: "Every teacher in the public
schools must hold pupils to a strict account for their conduct on the
way to and from school, on the playgrounds and during recess," and
then provides that boards of education should be liable for any judgment against the school district on account of injury to the person or
property arising out of the negligence of the district, or its officers, or
employees.-2
There are two major arguments on the side of expediency. There is
the reasoning that communities should not be forced to shoulder the
additional expense of paying damages for injury caused as a result of
the negligent supervision of pupils when they exercised due care in
appointing administrators and teachers.' 3 There is also the thinking
6

See note 4, supra.

7 Green, Fright Cases, 27 ILL. L. REv. 761 (1933).
8 See Borchard, The Federal Tort Claims Bill, 1 U.
9 SCHOOL CODE

§ 5.543.

OF CuI.

L. Rv. 1 (1933).

iON. C. L. (1929) § 5687.
1 CODE (1932) § 32-1003; The wording of the Idaho Statute is slightly different.
12 As an example see § 2.801 of the SCHOOL CODE of California referred to in
Forgnone v. Salvadore Union Elementary School District, 106 P. (2d) 932
(Calif. 1940).
13 It is recognized that liability even independent of statute, can rest on a school
district if trustees or school boards are negligent in hiring incompetent officials
or teachers. The negligence is too close to home to be overlooked in such
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that in many instances to force the communities to pay damages might
actually result in closing down a school. Both lines of thought simply
represent dollars and cents reasoning. They do, however, differ a little
in their weight.
The first argument above is in essence the very same thinking that
is submitted to justify antiquated teaching methods as a result of poor
equipment, materials, and over-crowded classes. It is the attitude that
the rule must exist-just as the inefficient school must exist-because
the people want only the kind of public service for which they desire
to pay. Such a position, of course, carries the philosophy that each
individual member of the community is willing to bear the risk of cost
of injury to his or her child. The fact that the risk may develop into
a back-breaking burden does not always seem to be considered.
Reflection produces the easily understood fact that the people of
some communities may desire to give greater protection to the physical
well-being of the child-to insure it adequate medical care and attention if an injury should grow out of the negligent failure to supervise
during school hours. Certainly, if people feel that children stand forth
as the saviors of democracy, they will demand statutory modification
of the old maxim which throws the cloak of protection about school
districts as regards their tort responsibility for negligent supervision of
pupils. If they do make such demand it would seem that no one should
regret the obliteration of a medieval rule of law. Rather, we should be
glad that the people who by their democratic procedures have established the school are willing to take on the additional responsibility of
protecting children injured in school because of careless supervision.14
The second argument based on expediency is the feeling that in
some instances damages might be so heavy as to force a particular
school district to close its doors. One could easily imagine negligent
supervision permitting an explosion which would wreck an entire
school building. The exponents of the "bankruptcy" philosophy have
been quite forceful in their point of view, and in their language they
have not been unmindful of social welfare. 5 The Wisconsin 6 court,
a situation. See Garber et al v. Central School Dist. No. 1 of Town of Sharon,
Schohare County, et al, 251 App. Div. 214, 295 N.Y. Supp. 850 (1937), Graff
v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 258 App. Div. 813, 15 N.Y.S. (2d) 941
(1939); Kolar v. Union Free School Dist. No. 9, Town of Lenox, 8 N.Y.S.
(2d) 985 (1939); Hines et al v. Board of Education of City of N. Y., 170
Misc. 745, 10 N.Y.S. (2d) 840 (1939).
14 This last sentence expresses the feeling of Dr. A. J. Foy Cross, Director of
Instruction, Omaha, Neb. Public Schools. It is not an unusual opinion. The
writer's own experience in public school administration leads to the conclusion
that there are large numbers of educators who share the same view.
15 In Ford v. School District of Kendall Borough, 121 Pa. 543, 15 At. 812 (1888)
the court specifically points out that the public welfare can best be served by
a rule of non-liability.
16 Folk v. City of Milwaukee, 108 Wis. 359, 84 N.W. 420 (1900).
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in discussing the situation if a rule of school board liability should prevail, said, "Results would be intolerable, and might necessitate the closing of schools by the exhaustion of funds to discharge judgments."' 7
It can be frankly acknowledged that judgments should not be permitted to close school doors. Perhaps for that reason it will be necessary to put a statutory limit upon the sum" that can be recovered for
any one negligent act. Even if a number of people are hurt as a result
of one careless act, the total amount of recovery can be limited and
apportioned among the injured. Such a technique should make the
financial breakdown of a school system almost an impossibility. It can
hardly be expected that there will be such a great number of negligent
acts in a period of time that bankruptcy will result.
One thing more needs clarification in connection with the arguments
for non-liability on the basis of expediency. It has often been claimed
that the funds gathered through taxation for the support of schools
could not be diverted into the payment of damages. The New York*'
and Washington 9 courts have shown that there is no need to hold such
a theory.
Another argument that can be raised against a charge of the
status quo as respects school district liability, is that a relaxation of
the common law by statutory change will produce a multiplicity of
suits based on fraudulent claims. In logical refutation of such an argument we find much legal literature which condemns denying justice
solely because of the fear of the possibility of more work or fraud.
Surely what Professor Prossere 9 has said is correct. "It is a pitiful
confession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice to deny
relief upon the ground that it will give the court too much work to
do." And as regards fraud, as both Dean Green 2' and Professor
Prosser have pointed out, there exists a protection in the fact that
the jury is still required (and as capable as always) to distinguish true
claims from false.
The one remaining challenge to a social liberalization of the rules of
tort liability in the area under discussion is the statement that the in- Inferentially, to the same effect was Anderson v. Board of Education of Fargo,
49 N.D. 181, 190 N.W. 807 (1922).
18 Williams v. Board of Trustees of District No. 1, Town of Eaton, 210 App.
Div. 161, 205 N.Y. Supp. 742 (1924).
39 Babcock et ux v. Seattle School District No. 1, 168 Wash. 557, 12 P. (2d) 752
(1932).
20 Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MacH. L. REV. 894

(1939). The statements here and those referred to infra, notes 21 and 22 were
made in connection with a different problem, but their application to our discussion cannot be seriously questioned.
21 Green, Fright Cases, 27 ILL. L. RFv. 761 (1933).
22
See note 20, supra. And furthermore, as Fuller and Casner have demonstrated
in their article, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HARV. L. REv. 437
(1941), enlargement of tort liability does not seem to result in fraudulent
claims with a resultant loss that cannot be borne.
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jured child can be recompensed from damages which may be recovered
against a negligent teacher or employee of the school district. Such an
outlook represents no more than a quarrel with the fictional nature of
the rule which makes a master liable for the negligent acts of his
servants as long as such servant is acting in the scope of his employment. It has long been admitted that such a rule is built entirely on
fiction. No one has clarified the point more brilliantly than Harold
Laski in his discussion "The Basis of Vicarious Liability.23" There it
is accurately said that the master-employer cannot actually control
his servant-employee. For practical reasons, however, the party hurt
by the negligent act of a servant was often permitted to recover damages from the master. It was felt that society must permit injured parties to recover from those with the deepest pockets. To hold otherwise would have meant that many injured people would fail to recover
from judgment-proof employees. Furthermore, it was felt that the
rule was not as unfair as it seemed. The party with the deepest pocket
was in a position to spread the loss among members of the community.
Hence the dogma based on a fiction-the fiction that the master could
control the servant-was allowed to exist because it seemed necessary
to produce the ultimate end-the greatest good for the communityjustice for parties who suffer physical harms. By the very same logic
it is possible to maintain that the law should make the school district
liable if harm results to pupils because of the negligent supervision of
children. The present rule of teacher responsibility can too often prove
to be meaningless because of the lack of ability of the teacher to pay
damages.
Before finally admitting, however, that statutory change can produce results which do not violate concepts of justness, it is necessary
to deal with the question as to whether school districts will be made
insurers of the safety of children during school hours. The answer has
been given in the negative by the Supreme Court of California in
Underhill v. Alameda Elementary School District of Alameda County
et al.2 4 There it was set forth that school districts (under the type of
statute previously alluded to in this discussion) are not insurers of the
safety of pupils at play or elsewhere. They are only liable if injuries
result from the negligence of their officers or employees. With that
statement in mind, therefore, it appears logical to look into some of the
cases to see whether or not the courts have set up too strict a standard
of teacher care.
In this respect the Supreme Court of Michigan has said 25 that "at
least in a limited sense the teacher stands in place of the parents, and
J. 105 (1916).
133 Calif. App. 624, 24 P. (2d) 849 (1933).
Gaincott v. Davis, 281 Mich. 515, 275 N.W. 229 (1937).

2326 YALE L.
24

25
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that in the faithful discharge of her duties in respect to the care and
custody of a pupil the teacher is bound to use reasonable care, tested
in the light of the existing relationship. It is not essential to liability
that the teacher's negligence be so extreme as to be wanton or wilful."
Reasoning of that nature does not demand super-human conduct on the
part of instructors. Ittakes cognizance of the dissenting justices' plea
in Thompson et al v. Board of Education of the City of New York
et a126 that "Boys will be boys." It heeds the pronouncement of Hack
et al v. Sacramento City Junior College District of Sacramento2 that
a teacher is not at fault "if pupils negligently carry out the teacher's
instructions of a proper nature."'28 All that is required, in the language
of the New York Court, 9 is that (the court is speaking about the
factual picture of recess periods and class rooms) "a teacher owes it
to her charges to exercise such care of them as a parent of ordinary
prudence would observe in comparable circumstances." The thinking
of the Nevada Supreme Court" further clarifies the problem. That
court has brought to light, "that teachers do not have merely the duty
of disciplining pupils after learning of any misconduct on their part,
but the further duty of observing their conduct to the end that they
may be properly dealt with in the event of any misconduct. It is not
sufficient that teachers apply disciplinary measures to pupils whose
misconduct may be reported to them, or may come under their observation by mere chance. The duty of teachers extends farther, and they
must, to a reasonable extent, watch the pupils for the purpose of seeing to it that their conduct while on the way to and from school, on
the playgrounds, during intermissions and in the classroom, is proper."
Certainly the word "dealt" in the above quotation can be reasonably
interpreted to connote that the teacher should hold herself ready to stop
unruly activity before any serious injury can be consummated. But
even though the court takes such an attitude the rules of causation
cannot be overlooked. In the face of the truth that "children will be
children" 3' an interesting question arises. What if as much harm as
was done would have been accomplished had the teacher been watching
and alert to act? Under such facts should the school district be immune
because the negligent supervision of the teacher did not cause the
harm? The proposition would seem to require an affirmative answer.
Suppose, however, it could be established that the obvious lack of attenApp. Div. 786, 6 N.Y.S. (2d) 921 (1938).
131 Calif. App. 444, 21 P. (2d) 477 (1933).
8To
the same effect, McCloy v. Huntington Park Union High School Dist. of
Los Angeles County, 139 Calif. App. 237, 33 P. (2d) 882 (1934).
29 Hoose v. Drumm et Al, 281 N.Y. 54, 22 N.E. (2d) 233 (1939).
30 Nevada Industrial Comm. v. Leonard et al, 68 P. (2d) 576 (Nev. 1937).
31 Expressed by the dissenting justices in Thompson et al v. Board of Education
of City of New York et al, 255 App. Div. 786, 6 N.Y.S. (2d) 921 (1938) as
"Boys will be boys."
26255

227
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tion of the teacher induced the child-actor to become bold and attempt
his unruly act. Would not the answer to the above questions be different? Rules of causation are not always easy to manipulate. Experience
has, nevertheless, established that justice can be obtained.
As a result of the presentation in previous paragraphs some doubts
may have arisen in connection with supervision during manual training and vocational courses, and during school trips. It would seem
apparent that if the child is mature enough to take vocational work,
and if he has received the permission of his parents to go on a school
trip, the teacher only needs to exercise the care possible under the circumstances. A warning note, however, may be sounded about sending
children on school errands unless there is a grave necessity for doing
SO.
Another question that might come to mind in connection with the
responsibility to supervise is whether or not the duty to supervise
would require inspection to determine if any equipment used in and
about the school is in a dangerous condition. In Kelley v. School District No. 71 of King's County,S2 the Washington Court imposed a
duty of reasonable inspection. The New York3" court in a case which
is not very useful because of its brevity came to a contrary conclusion.
Up to this point in the article the court's attitude has been analyzed
from the side of school district responsibility for negligent supervision
on the part of teachers. Completeness in logic dictates that we raise the
question of responsibility for the negligent acts of principals or those
persons who have immediate administrative control over a school. In
Thompson et al. v. Board of Education of the City of New York 34 the
court said that "whether the principal was negligent in failing to promulgate more adequate regulations for the safe conduct of the pupils
was a question of fact for the jury." A principal can, therefore, be
negligent in respect to the supervision of children. Just, however, as
was the case in connection with teachers the courts are going to test
for negligence under a realistic and sane formula. The New York
Court in reversing the Thompson" case on the evidence made it clear
that when the principal promulgated orderly rules for pupil conduct
he acted as a reasonable man, and that since he had teachers supervising at the time of dismissal he should not be held responsible for the
result of the act of an unruly boy who broke into a run on his way
down the stairs. The justices specifically decided that "the appellant
could not personally attend to each class at the same time, nor was any
32 102 Wash. 343, 173 Pac. 333 (1918).
33 Handy v. Hadley-Luzerne Union Free School District No. 1, 277 N.Y. 685,

14 N.E. (2d) 390 (1938).

34 See note 31, supra.
35

Thompson et al v. Board of Education of the City of New York et al, 280
N.Y.92, 19 N.E. (2d) 796 (1939).
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such duty imposed on him." It is gratifying to realize that the courts
are not going to nullify the educational usefulness of a principal and
make him into a super sleuth. There is responsibility imposed on the
principal which is commensurate with his function as a school man.
Certainly he cannot shirk his duty as regards general features of administration. The intelligent planning and publicizing of orderly rules for
school dismissal would certainly fall within his province as an administrator. General regulations to avoid congestion in rest rooms, lunch
rooms, on the playgrounds, and at recess time would require the attention of a principal. A workable routine for, and compliance with the
state law as regards fire drills would be a duty of a principal. If such
routine was not explained to teachers and children, and if they were
not allowed to become familiar with it through practice, it would seem
that injuries might grow out of many factual situations and that the
principal would be held liable for the harm caused.
One other fear has been expressed by those who shy away from
enlarging school district tort responsibility. Thinking primarily of the
accidents that might happen in the physical education or manual training room they are worried over the fact that juries might be able to
determine choice of subjects in the curriculum. On this point the California 36 court had a very intelligent answer. The court told the jury:
"You are instructed that you are not to substitute your judgment with regard to what is correct and sound educational policy
in the conduct of physical education for that of the Board of
Education, but you are only to determine whether or not in the
carrying out of said physical education work there was any negligence by an employee of the defendant which was the proximate cause of the injury."
And then the court in its decision went on to say:
"It does not lie within the province of a jury to determine
whether a certain subject should be taught. But school authorities may be negligent in requiring a student to take a particular
course of study."
To round out the article reason dictates an analysis of the philosophy in respect to liability for negligent supervision in the light of some
educational techniques and objectives. The goal of modern education
is to develop to an optimum degree pupil initiative and independence.
To those who are ultra-progressive this has meant in a great number
of instances an attitude which wheedled little Johnny and Annabella
and often allowed them to browse unsupervised like contented cows.
Obviously, such an outlook does not jibe with a philosophy which
would impose liability on school boards for negligent supervision. For
the law would often condemn the technique of the ultra-progressives
3

6Bellnan v. San Francisco High School District, 81 P. (2d) 894 (Calif. 1938).
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as careless and negligent. It is doubtlessly true, however, that many of
these ultra-progressives would be furnishing much of the impetus
for the enlargement of school district tort responsibility. At the same
time they would naively be influencing a vast army of school men and
women who come under their influence in universities, summer sessions, lecture halls, and through the pages of professional literature to
violate the law by careless supervision. This very situation-this inconsistency of approach is as good an argument as any to show the
error inherent in the attitude of the ultra-progressive. In contrast it
firmly establishes the sanely progressive on a sound foundation. For it
can be understood that the forward-looking conservative type progressive never teaches careless or negligent supervision. Instead he holds
that the curriculum must be lifelike and must be built around pupil
activities which result in learnings with "carry-over-to-life" value. Such
developments as initiative, independence, safety habits, and belief in
fundamental truth and morality are the fundamental purposes of the
school. In the words of a well known director of instruction 7 for a
large public school system, "They come first ahead of standardized
academic achievement and completely displace such goals as perfect
discipline under rigid supervision, or blind obedience to one's superiors." But supervision is not neglected. Modern educators who keep
their feet on the ground readily admit that while increasing emphasis
and training to develop self-reliance makes a pupil more capable of
coping with everyday life and even emergency situations, the child is
not a full-fledged thinking adult. Consequently, teachers have a responsibility of constant guidance and supervision.
From what has just been said the conclusion follows that if school
board liability for negligent supervision is enlarged it will not be a
hindrance to the sane, middle-of-the-road, progressive. The educator
does not have to fear that the change will force him back to the old
technique of a now thoroughly discredited era of excessive Prussianlike formalism. Only the unrealistic, radical will be curbed by the
change. That is as it should be. From the standpoint of both educational and legal philosophy there would seem to be no reason why the
public should not decide to enlarge school district responsibility in the
manner set forth in this article. It should also be remembered that they
can spread the loss by liability insurance if they find it more expedient
than setting up a sinking fund.

n Dr. A. J. Foy Cross, Omaha Public Schools, Omaha, Neb.

